Analysis of the Virus SARS-CoV-2 as a Potential Bioweapon in Light of International Literature.

INTRODUCTION: As of early 2022, the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic still represents a worldwide medical emergency situation. The ongoing vaccination programs can slow down the spread of the virus; however, from time to time, the newly emerging variants of concern and antivaccination movements carry the possibility for the disease to remain in our daily lives. After the appearance of SARS-CoV-2, there was scholarly debate whether the virus was of natural origin, or it emerged from a laboratory, some even thinking the agent's potential biological weapon properties suggest the latter scenario. Later, the bioweapon theory was dismissed by the majority of experts, but the question remains that despite its natural origin, how potent a biological weapon the SARS-CoV-2 virus can become over time. MATERIALS AND METHODS: Based on 12 bioweapon threat assessment criteria already published in 2018, we performed a literature search and review, focusing on relevant potential bioweapon properties of the virus SARS-CoV-2. Instead of utilizing a survey among experts, we tried to qualify and quantify characteristics according to the available data found in peer-reviewed papers. We also identified other key elements not mentioned in the original 12 bioweapon criteria, which can play an important role in assessing future biological weapons. RESULTS: According to the international literature we analyzed, SARS-CoV-2 is a moderately infectious agent (ID50 estimated between 100 and 1,000), with high infection-to-disease ratio (35%-45% rate of asymptomatic infected) and medium incubation period (1-34 days, mean 6-7 days). Its morbidity and mortality rate can be categorized as medium (high morbidity rate with significant mortality rate). It can be easily produced in large quantities, has high aerosol stability, and has moderate environmental stability. Based on laboratory experiments and statistical model analysis, it can form and is contagious with droplet nuclei, and with spray technique utilization, it could be weaponized effectively. Several prophylactic countermeasures are available in the form of vaccines; however, specific therapeutic options are much more limited. In connection with the original assessment criteria, the SARS-CoV-2 only achieved a "0" score on the ease of detection because of readily available, relatively sensitive, and specific rapid antigen tests. Based on the pandemic experience, we also propose three new assessment categories: one that establishes a mean to measure the necessary quarantine restrictions related to a biological agent, another one that can represent the personal protective equipment required to work safely with a particular agent, and a third one that quantifies the overall disruptive capability, based on previous real-life experiences. These factors could further specify the threat level related to potential biological weapons. CONCLUSIONS: Our results show that the virus can become a potent bioweapon candidate in the future, achieving a total score of 24 out of 36 on the original 12 criteria. The SARS-CoV-2 has already proven its pandemic generating potential and, despite worldwide efforts, still remains an imminent threat. In order to be prepared for the future possibility of the virus arising as a bioweapon, we must remain cautious and take the necessary countermeasures.

Role of duties related to COVID-19 suspected, probable and confirmed fatality cases / [Elhunytakkal kapcsolatos teendok COVID­19-gyanús, valószínusített és megerosített esetekben]

The outbreak caused by SARS-CoV-2 beta-coronavirus, first identified in Wuhan, China, was declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization on 11th March, 2020. In Hungary, the first confirmed COVID-19 case was reported on 4th March, 2020, and on 15th March, the first fatality related to the infection was announced. At the moment of the latter event, there was no central, standardized guideline, which could explain the necessary precautions, and provide an unequivocal description on how to handle the dead body. The procedure of transportation, storage, occurent autopsy or final disposition of the deceased raise a lot of questions, especially on how to carry out these tasks. Legislation related to infectious diseases and decedent management in general do not provide enough information on how to perform duties in a COVID-19 fatality case. The chief medical officer suspended the execution of autopsies, except in cases of unnatural death, since 19th March, however, the transportation and storage of fatalities can still be a problem. The Department of Pathology of the Healthcare Professional College of the Ministry of Human capacities published a procedure on recommended post-mortem duties on 21st March, but the suggested protocols only represent a narrow spectrum of international recommendations. Therefore supplementation may be necessary. Sadly, post-mortem protocols, in spite of their importance, are also underrepresented in the international literature. A further problem, wich makes adoptability difficult, is that available foreign guidelines and algorithms are optimized for different legislation, and organisations, resources not available in our country. In this article, besides providing a summary of literature, we would also like to make practical recommendations which may increase the safety of healthcare providers participating in the treatment or pathological duties with COVID-19 suspected, probable and confirmed cases. Orv Hetil. 2020; 161(17): 713­722.